ATTAINMENT OF D-DAY OBJECTIVES (7-8 JUNE)

THE OUTCOME of the assault on Omaha Beach was not clear at the end of D Day. A shallow lodgement had been secured, 1,500 to 2,000 yards deep in the area of furthest advance near Colleville. Weak enemy forces were still holding out in remnants of the beach defenses, and artillery fire could still harass any section of the landing area. Unloadings of vehicles and supplies had fallen far short of the D-Day schedule. Artillery and tank support for the infantry ashore was reduced by severe losses of materiel. Enemy troops had shown plenty of determination and fighting spirit; if the Germans could muster sufficient force to counterattack this beginning of a beachhead, they might imperil its existence.

Therefore, the action of the next few days would be decisive. For success, two things were essential: advance inland far enough to put the beach area out of artillery range and to secure maneuver room for further progress; and organization of the beach for maximum landings of supply and reinforcement. The first phase of the effort was to carry forward the original plan and reach D-Day objectives.

Trevieres-Tour-en-Bessin

Certain readjustments had to be made in the 1st Division's plan for attaining its objectives (Map No. XI). The 16th Infantry needed time to get its scattered units reassembled; therefore, its assignments were turned over in part to units of the 26th RCT. The 1st Battalion of the 26th was attached to the 16th, and at 1100 on 7 June received the mission of taking the high ground west and southwest of Port-en-Bessin, including Mount Cauvin, and linking up with British XXX Corps. The 3d Battalion of the 26th had moved during the night to a position south of St-Laurent on the flank of the 18th Infantry. Attached to the 18th, the battalion was ordered to take Formigny and cover the right flank of the 18th's attack south. This attack, the main effort of the day, was aimed at the original objectives of the 18th RCT: the high ground just north of Trevieres, and the Mandeville-Mosles area south of the Aure. Elements of the 7th, 32d, and 62d Field Artillery Battalions were ashore and available for support, and the 5th Field Artillery Battalion landed during the day and went into action. Only five tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion were ready for action on 7 June, but the 745th had landed during the night and was attached to units of the attacking infantry, mainly the 18th. Mopping up of the ground occupied on D Day was a timeconsuming process. All during the night, small enemy groups had been trying to escape from the area north of had been badly used up in the assault and the Colleville-St-Laurent highway, filtering

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through the 16th Infantry's scattered units and starting sporadic fire fights. In the early morning, as drivers of the 1st Battalion Headquarters were getting ready to move toward a new motor park, they found and captured 30 Germans in the field next to their night position. Back at the beach, enemy snipers were so troublesome to the gunners of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion that they were forced to organize an attack on the bluff with artillery personnel. These were typical of many small incidents that prolonged the confusion in rear areas. The major job was the pocket of resistance at Colleville, which was dealt with during the morning of the 7th by the 2d Battalion of the 16th. Company G was through the village by 1000, and found enemy resistance weak. Some 52 Germans of the 726th Infantry gave up without a fight; the Company L patrol, captured at Cabourg the day before, had talked the enemy into a receptive mood for surrendering. The main damage to German forces in Colleville was inflicted by the 2d Battalion of the 18th Infantry, posted south and southeast on the escape route from the village. During the night and morning, 160 Germans were captured and 50 killed in this area. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 16th Infantry spent all of the day in mopping-up work, moving short distances south and southeast from Colleville behind the advancing 18th Infantry. At dark, they were still encountering scattered machine-gun and sniper fire.

The advance eastward toward Port-en-Bessin was accomplished without meeting enemy resistance in any strength. The 3d Battalion of the 16th, supported by Company B of the 745th Tank Battalion, went straight down the coastal highway and occupied Huppain for the night. Supporting this advance, the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion fired five missions, expending 683 rounds, and reported the destruction of an enemy battery of medium artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 26th went south to Russy (reached at 1705), and then east to a position about 1,000 yards from Mount Cauvin. British commando units were reported on the edge of Porten-Bessin, and by evening a juncture between V Corps and the British 50 Division was in sight.

The attack of the 18th Infantry was slow in getting started but made good progress during the afternoon. The 1st Battalion met only small and isolated groups of enemy resistance and was effectively aided in dealing with these by the five tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion. The battalion crossed the Bayeux-Isigny highway shortly after noon and ambushed some cyclists from reconnaissance units of the 352d Division. The tanks reached the vicinity of Engranville at 1400 and shelled the village. Enemy resistance lasted until evening, when Company C attacked and forced an enemy platoon across the river. The Germans had 15 casualties. The battalion then occupied a defensive position on ground which dominated the approaches to the Aure. The situation on its right flank was somewhat unsatisfactory, as the enemy still held Formigny. The 3d Battalion of the 26th Infantry, advancing down the St-Laurent road, had been stopped a half-mile short of Formigny by strong resistance from machine-gun nests and made no progress for the rest of the day. This left the 18th at Engranville exposed to attack from its rear.

The 3d Battalion of the 18th Infantry kept pace with the 1st Battalion, going through Surrain at 1215 and reaching the Bayeux highway just north of the Aure at 1700. The river crossing was made without meeting effective resistance, and by 2400 the battalion was in defensive positions southeast of Mandeville, on the flank of the important enemy base at Trevieres. Casualties of the

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battalion in the day's advance were 4 killed and 27 wounded.

Still further east, a second crossing of the Aure was effected by the 2d Battalion of the 18th Infantry. Supported by a platoon of tanks from Company C, 745th Tank Battalion, the battalion left the Colleville area at 1000 in two columns and reached the Aure at 1440. No resistance was met until Company G in the western column reached Houtteville, where enemy mortar and machine-gun fire from across the river forced deployment. The second column, however, reaching the river south of Bellefontaine, rushed a platoon across the 300 yards of causeway and bridge before meeting enemy fire. Tanks went across to support the platoon, the rest of the company followed, and Company G side-slipped east to take the same route. Driving the enemy out of their

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defensive positions, Companies F and G moved on promptly toward Mosles, leaving Company E to clean up bypassed pockets of resistance. Mosles, the objective, was entered at 1700. Thirty enemy dead were found after the sharp action at the crossing, which cost the 2d Battalion only a few men and one tank. A patrol sent down the Bayeux road reported enemy in Tour-en-Bessin.

By nightfall on 7 June, a part of the D-Day objectives had been reached. Even more encouraging were the indications of badly disorganized enemy resistance. Not only had the Germans failed to develop any counterattack, but they had shown little strength in opposing an advance made on a broad front by widely separated battalions. This advance had cut the main highway for lateral communications near the beachhead and had accomplished two crossings of the Aure. Only in the FormignyTrevieres area was the enemy in force sufficient to check the 1st Division's progress. Intelligence estimates put the 1t Battalion of the 726th Infantry south of Port-en-Bessin, elements of the 916th south of the Aure from Tour-en-Bessin to Trevieres, and elements of the 915th at Formigny. Enemy artillery fire had been light, though the beaches were still under harassing fire.

In response to a request by V Corps, the Ninth Air Force flew 35 missions of squadron strength on 7 June in the one from Bayeux west along the Aure valley, with one squadron always over the target area. Enemy gun positions were priority targets in these missions, but were difficult to locate. Highway and rail targets, as well as enemy concentration areas in Cerisy Forest, received most of the weight of attacks by 467 planes, using 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs and fragmentation clusters.

The situation at Formigny was cleared up during the early morning hours of 8 June. About midnight Company B of the 18th, helped by tanks of Company B, 745th Tank Battalion, attacked from the southeast and drove out a small enemy force, which lost 10 killed and 15 prisoners. North of the village. enemy machine-gun positions continued to block the 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, until late in the morning. In part, the delay at Formigny was due to lack of contact between the two battalions attacking from different sides of the village.

A counterattack "scare" developed early in the morning of 8 June at Mandeville. At 0200 a large combat patrol infiltrated the defensive positions of the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Some personnel in the rear command post and motor park were temporarily captured, but after daylight the patrol was overpowered and driven out with enemy losses of 25, killed and prisoners. In the confusion, the 18th Infantry Command Post near Surrain received reports of German tanks in "severe attack." With every staff briefed to expect counterattacks, this news caused a severe flurry back through corps headquarters; between 0600 and 0800, V Corps Headquarters was taking active measures to assemble tanks, antitank guns, and tank destroyer units for meeting a possible emergency south of the Aure. By 0850, the situation was cleared up and orders were issued to resume normal missions. For the rest of 8 June, the 1st and 3d Battalions held their positions north and east of Trevieres, patrolling to the outskirts of that town. Trevieres was shelled by naval guns in the afternoon, and there were indications that only minor enemy forces remained there.

On D+2, main action in the 1st Division zone shifted to the left flank, where the 26th RCT went after its D-Day objectives in the Tour-en-Bessin area. The movement had begun late on 7 June, when the 2d Battalion of the 26th Infantry, released at 1745 from division reserve, was ordered to seize the

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high ground at the crossroads between Mosles and Tour-en-Bessin. The battalion moved southeast along the front of the 16th Infantry, crossed the Aure at midnight a little west of Etreham, and reached its objective about 0530 on 8 June.

Enemy artillery and infantry were reported in some strength at Tour-enBessin, and the 26th Infantry at 0800 requested an air mission. Division notified the regiment that adequate fire support from artillery and naval guns would be available if the air mission failed. The air attack was made by fighter-bombers shortly before 0900; an armored patrol got into Tour-en-Bessin by 1140, reporting the town "empty and flat." The 2d Battalion, reinforced by a company of the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion and Company C of the 745th Tank Battalion, waited on the advance of the rest of the regiment before moving into the town.

The other two battalions of the 26th were slow in reaching the scene. The 1st Battalion, its objective the ground northeast of Tour-en-Bessin, pushed patrols through Etreham about noon, encountering only snipers; then, determined resistance from prepared positions stopped the battalion at the river crossing. The rest of the day was spent in efforts to get across, with artillery support made difficult by the presence of 2d Battalion units not far to the southwest. By evening only one company of the 1st Battalion was across the Aure. The 3d Battalion was held up north of Formigny all morning, pending arrival of a battalion of the 115th Infantry which was counter-marching from Louvieres to Formigny for

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the purpose of strengthening the sector north of Trevieres. Released to the 26th Regiment at 1340, the 3d Battalion started down the Bayeux highway toward its objective, Ste-Anne, just beyond Tour-en-Bessin. It reached the 2d Battalion position at 1800 and was ordered to jump off at 2040 for attack straight through Tour-en-Bessin, supported by Company C of the 745th Tank Battalion. The force went through the town about midnight, the infantry moving in two files on either side of the road, with six tanks between the files at the head of the column. Directed by the battalion commander, the tanks sprayed sniper positions and suspected strongpoints. Light enemy resistance was brushed aside, and the column reached Ste-Anne about 0130, in contact with enemy patrols retreating to the east.

The enemy-held corridor north of Tour-en-Bessin was now in great danger of being cut. At the end of 7 June the Germans still held Port-en-Bessin and south of it the high ground along the Drome Valley. During 8 June this salient was steadily reduced. The British 47 Commandos entered Port-en-Bessin about 0800 and fought through the day to clear the area south from the port to the Aure River, while the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, blocked enemy escape to the west. Further south the British had entered Bayeux on 7 June, and were approaching the Drome crossings at Vaucelles and Sully by late afternoon of the 8th. The narrowing enemy pocket was held by remnants of the 1st Battalion, 726th Infantry, reinforced on 7-8 June by some elements of the 517th Battalion, 30th Mobile Brigade, rushed up from reserve positions near Coutances and StLo. By evening of the 8th there was a chance that much of this force might be trapped by an advance of the 26th Infantry. The plan was checkmated. Very determined enemy resistance held off the 26th at Etreham and stopped the British efforts to get past the Drome. A violent action at Ste-Anne, in the early hours of 9 June, kept the base of the corridor open.

The 3d Battalion of the 26th Infantry had dug in hastily at Ste-Anne to meet an expected counterattack, with Company L just north of the village, Company I facing east, and Company K to the south. A light rain began to fall and visibility was bad. About 0300 Company L's position was overrun by a strong German column including ammunition trucks, bicycles, and other vehicles, the presence of which suggested that the enemy was withdrawing from the north and had blundered into the American lines. What followed was a wild fire-fight, at close range, with both sides hampered by surprise and confusion. The 2d Battalion held on in the village; tanks were of little use in the darkness, but effective aid was rendered by area fire from six battalions of artillery and naval guns, directed northeast and east of the village. Casualties in Company L were severe, due mainly to shells hitting two trucks loaded with men temporarily captured by the Germans. By 0630, the 3d Battalion had restored its positions, taking 125 prisoners who testified to the effectiveness of the artillery fire.

Although the enemy had lost heavily in men and vehicles in this action, the corridor stayed open, and Vaucelles, a mile east of Ste-Anne, was retaken from the British in the same period. During the night and early morning, the enemy managed to withdraw most of his force from the salient, at the cost of considerable losses and further disorganization. When the 1st Battalion of the 26th resumed its attack south of Etreham on the morning of 9 June, only light resistance was met from the remnants of enemy forces north of the highway.

With the 26th Infantry beyond Tour-en-Bessin. the 1st Division had reached its

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D-Day objectives. This mission had been largely accomplished by two regiments, with all battalions committed and moving on a front so wide that intervals between battalions were as much as 3 000 yards. No enemy counterattack had developed, though it was known from intercepted messages that attack was ordered for 8 June. There was further evidence of disorganization on among the regiments of the 352d Division, strung out on a front of some 25 miles between Isigny and Bayeux. Elements of the

915th, 916th, and 726th Infantry were in the sector Trevieres-Bayeux. On 7 June they received their first reinforcement in the 517th Battalion of the 30th Mobile Brigade, rushed north from Coutances in time to be badly mauled in the Port-en-Bessin salient. The other two battalions of this brigade were identified the next day in the Tour-en-Bessin and Bayeux areas, where they were unable to restore the situation.

Intelligence reports by 9 June warned of possible concentration of reinforcements, including armor, in Cerisy Forest. However, barring arrival of reinforcements, all evidence indicated that the Germans had now lost whatever chance they once had of passing to the offensive on the 1st Division front. They had continued their policy of the first day in offering dogged resistance at tactically important points, often from prepared positions. In hedgerow country, this had slowed down the 1st Division's progress, and the delay was increased by the willingness of small enemy groups and individuals to fight on in bypassed positions. Nevertheless, these tactics could not stop the advance, and they steadily wore down enemy strength. Most troops of the bypassed groups never got back; a major proportion were killed, and by 9 June the 1st Division had taken over 600 prisoners. Enemy artillery, so effective on D Day, was less and less in evidence thereafter. In contrast, by 8 June five battalions of artillery were in support of the 1st Division and adding to the powerful fire of the naval guns.

Grandcamp-Isigny Area

General Gerhardt, commanding the 29th Division, had landed on the evening of D Day and set up his command post near the Vierville exit, waiting for orders to takeover command of the 29th Division. General Cota made several trips from his headquarters in St-Laurent to 1st Division and V Corps Headquarters during the night and early morning and saw General Gerhardt twice to keep him informed of plans. These could be formed only gradually, in view of the uncertain situation around Vierville and St-Laurent and of continued difficulties in communications. When Col. Canham came to St-Laurent at 0930 to see General Cota and find his 2d and 3d Battalions, the road between Vierville and St-Laurent was still under enemy fire and he was forced to make the trip along the beach to D-3 exit.

Plans for D+1 had to be adjusted to meet a number of limiting circumstances (Map No. XII). Of the two regiments ashore, the 116th had been severely used and most of its units were still badly scattered; the 1st Battalion started the day with about 250 men. Two artillery battalions (58th and 111th) were ashore, but with less than half their guns. The 175th Infantry was still afloat, scheduled to begin landing at 1030. A number of pressing tasks faced these units as a preliminary to moving against D-Day objectives. The enemy still held a strongpoint at the western edge of St-Laurent. Small parties of riflemen, with occasional support from machine guns and mortars, were reappearing at points along the bluffs to harass the beaches. D-3 exit was not yet fully opened. That the enemy was still close to Vierville, on the south,

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was proved early (0530) on 7 June when an attack forced Company B of the 121st Engineers out of the Chateau de Vaumicel and back into the village. At Pointe du Hoe, three companies of the 2d Rangers were known to be isolated, weakened by heavy casualties and in need of ammunition.

Measures to deal with these initial problems were taken by early morning. The 1st Battalion of the 116th, the 5th Ranger Battalion, and Companies A, B, and C of the 2d Rangers, supported by tanks, were ordered to drive west on the highway toward Pointe du Hoe. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 116th were to mop up remnants of enemy resistance along the bluffs, while the 3d Battalion, 115th Infantry, cleaned out St-Laurent and then moved to Vierville for any similar work needed there. The rest of the 115th would push on toward Longueville, its objective on the Isigny highway.

The mopping-up work consumed most of the day. After a heavy naval bombardment, the 3d Battalion of the 115th move on the enemy strongpoint blocking the St-Laurent crossroad and encountered opposition only from snipers. By 0900 St-Laurent was cleared and the 3d Battalion moved toward Vierville, followed by the 1st. Nearing Vierville and receiving word that they were not needed there, they turned south toward Longueville. The enemy counterattack at Vierville had not been in strength, and the situation had been restored by keeping four companies of Rangers and some tanks to protect the village. The 3d Battalion of the 116th, only partly assembled, went after the remnants of enemy resistance along the bluff west from D-3, finding a few machine-gun positions still in action and taking some pris